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Water is rapidly moving from a political commodity to a
market commodity as water shortages call for innovative
solutions. Markets are redistributing water between
traditional needs such as agriculture and urban (Anderson
1998) uses as well as reallocating the precious resource to
environmental uses such as fish and wildlife habitat
(Landry 1999). Though most of this reallocation is still
taking place within political jurisdictions, there is
increasing pressure to allow for markets across borders,
making water a new export commodity. Economic
growth, rising incomes, and growing populations are all
contributing to the pressure to switch from political to
market allocation, as growing demands outstrip
government supplies.
Water marketing often starts when governments try to
establish prices that more accurately reflect scarcity.
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), most countries have made
substantial progress “toward the goal of more efficient
and effective pricing” of water (OECD 1999, 2). These
pricing reforms are encouraging private entrepreneurs to
consider how they can get into the game. As a result, the
global market for water already generates more than $300
billion in annual revenue. Potential growth in the
industry is even more staggering. The World Bank
estimates $600 billion will be invested to meet the
demand for water in sanitation, irrigation, and power
over the next ten years.
Like so many other commodities, water is going global.
A number of recent news articles have described water as
“blue gold” (The Economist 1999, 12) and the “the oil of
the 21st Century” ( Lawrence 1996, 1). Entrepreneurs are
responding to supply and demand imbalance by seeking
ways to transport water from countries and regions with
plentiful amounts to areas in short supply. John Hayward,
a water expert for the World Bank, commented that
“water will be moved around the world as oil is now”
(quoted in Lawrence 1996, 1). In fact, on a small scale,
water is already being exported like oil in South Asia, the
Middle East, and the Mediterranean. In addition, policy
changes are opening up interstate water trading in
Australia and the United States. But free trade critics
contend that international water markets will drain
countries of their most precious resource. This article
examines the development of water exports throughout
the world and explores policies for international and
interstate water markets that confer benefits on regions
exporting water. 
 
SHORTAGES AREN’T NECESSARILY MOTHER
NATURE’S FAULT
Despite the uneven and irregular supplies, water
shortages are not all due to nature. Many commodities are
erratically supplied but shortages need not persist.
Shortages are alleviated through the market process,
allowing demand and supply to equalize. For example,
oranges are sold in Toronto, Canada, even though they
are not grown there, and people in oil-poor Switzerland
have gasoline from the oil-rich Middle East. The energy
crisis of the 1970s was solved as higher prices induced
demanders to conserve and suppliers to search for
alternative sources of oil and other forms of energy.
Water pricing and water markets solve shortages in
supply, but not while politics dominate water allocation.
Water supply traditionally has come from governmental
agencies which have set prices below those necessary to
balance supply and demand. Low prices provide little
incentive for consumers to conserve, and low revenues
provide little incentive for producers to increase supply.
It is not surprising that classic shortages arise. 
As shortages force government agencies to reconsider
their pricing policies, there is evidence that insatiable
demands can be curtailed. When cities raise the price of
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water by 10 percent, water demand goes down by as much
as 12 percent (OECD 1999; Gibbons 1986). Simply
charging for water can have an even greater effect. In
some parts of the world, demand fell by as much as 61
percent during peak periods and 35 percent annually
when consumers’ water usage was metered (OECD
1999). Water will flow between water rich and water poor
regions if real markets, not just politically controlled
prices, can be brought to bear.
TRADING WATER TO QUENCH THE WORLD’S
THIRST
International free trade agreements such as the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and World
Trade Organization (WTO) have the potential to create
international water markets. Some foreign trade
representatives see water markets as an opportunity to
help alleviate water shortages in their home countries.
But other countries with vast water supplies argue that it
will be impossible to turn off the tap to lucrative water
markets once trading begins. They worry that their
countries will be drained dry under free trade. Canada,
for example, has ardently opposed the idea of
international water markets. With the world’s largest
supply of freshwater, Canada has sought to preclude
water from international trade agreements, even when
individuals have had clearly specified water rights and
could find willing buyer-willing seller exchanges
(Anderson and Grewell 2000, 6).
During the 1999 WTO conference, a congressional
delegation from the Great Lakes region and trade
representatives from Canada tried to ensure that water
exports are prohibited. The Clinton administration
resisted the move, contending that treaties currently in
place are sufficient. Deputy U.S. Trade Representative
Richard Fisher added that bringing the issue before the
conference “would risk creating an international issue
where none currently exists” (Terrana 1999). 
Free trade critics have advanced a number of arguments
to support the position that NAFTA and the WTO
adversely affect member countries’ ability to control
water exports, while free trade proponents contend that
NAFTA strengthens the hand of government in
controlling exports (Johnson 1994, 56). These agreements
place limitations on the ability of member countries to
impose export restrictions and taxes that could effectively
place an embargo on water exports. The trade
agreements, however, allow countries to control the
allocation of water in its natural state while allowing
opportunities for water exports (Johnson 1994, 57). 
The General Agreement on Tarriffs and Trade (GATT),
NAFTA, and similar agreements impose obligations
respecting trade in products. The ordinary meaning of
product is “something that is produced.” In order for
water to be considered a product under trade agreements
such as NAFTA, it must be gathered, stored, treated,
bottled, or otherwise packaged (Johnson 1994 57). Water
in a pipeline or tanker would also be considered a
tradable product under these agreements and is subject to
international trade obligations. Water in its natural state
is not a product and is not affected by these agreements
(International Joint Commission 2000; Johnson 1994, 57;
Little 1996, 142).
Several reviewers have suggested ways that countries
such as Canada could control exports without violating
international obligations (Johnson 1994, 63; Little 1996,
150). First, any restrictions must affect exporters from all
member countries equally so that the national treatment
requirements are not violated. Second, the restrictions
must regulate water in the natural state and should place
allocation requirements on its general use. Restrictions
should not specifically prohibit companies from acquiring
licenses for water exports. In order to comply with
existing trade agreements, any restrictions would have to
have an environmental objective and attempt to regulate
the general use and conservation of water (Johnson 1994,
58). 
EXPORTS AND LARGE SCALE WATER
PROJECTS
Water export markets can come in many sizes, from
large-scale megaprojects to smaller, more economically
feasible proposals. Much of the resistance to international
water markets has little to do with real markets and a lot
to do with government intervention. When water
transfers are proposed, they are usually for massive
projects that require extensive government subsidies
(Anderson 1994, 4). The tremendous cost of these
projects prevents them from being built. 
In North America alone there have been a number of
grandiose water export schemes proposed since the
1950s. One of the most notorious is the North American
Water and Power Alliance (NAWPA), which proposed to
divert 308 billion cubic meters (250 million acre-feet) per
year of Canadian and Alaskan waters through Canada to
the United States and Mexico. This diversion scheme was
developed in 1964 by the Los Angeles-based Ralph M.
Parsons Company. The construction cost of NAWPA at
that time was estimated to be between $80 billion and
$100 billion ($414 billion and $517 billion in 1998
dollars), but the project has never got off the ground
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because of its cost. Similarly, the Great Recycling and
Northern Development (GRAND) canal project, first
conceived in 1959, would have diverted water from James
Bay in Northern Canada to the Great Lakes where the
water would be stored until transferred to a final
destination in the United States. The estimated cost of the
project in 1984 was $100 billion. 
These and several other megawater projects met stiff
public resistance and would not have been launched
without substantial governmental subsidies. Even the
NAWPA, which claimed to be entirely backed by the
private sector, asked the Canadian, United States, and
Mexican governments to fund a $50 million
environmental analysis. These projects have invoked
suspicion and misunderstanding of what water
transactions would look like under a free trade regime. 
A fundamental problem with most proposed international
water transfers is that the people who would benefit
would not have to pay the enormous costs of the projects.
On the demand side, the “buying” country has an
insatiable thirst because the real cost of water
consumption is hidden in subsidies, taxes, and other
fiscal illusions (Anderson 1994, 4). On the supply side,
the citizens of the “selling” country gain little or nothing
if exports are allowed. This makes it nearly costless for
them to ban exports. Consequently, water management
agencies and water users are not faced with the full price
of using the resource. Users do not pay the costs of
storing and delivering the water, nor do they face the
opportunity costs of banning water exports. 
In order for the resistance to international and interstate
trading to lessen increasing water scarcity will have to
drive up potential gains from trade. This will require
policies that allow individuals, not federal, provincial, or
state governments, to realize these gains as well as face
the opportunity cost of not selling water. Markets that
rely on clearly defined and tradable water rights are
overcoming many of these challenges. In several
communities where rights are well defined and local
citizens benefit from the transfers, water export is
supported.
NORTH AMERICAN WATER TRADING
In the early 1990s, international water trades among
Canada, the United States and the rest of the world
seemed imminent. In British Columbia, six Canadian
companies held licenses to export nearly 55.5 million
cubic meters (45,000 acre-feet) of water annually. The
companies planned to ship water with ocean tankers to
regions in need of water. 
Shortly after issuing the permits, however, the provincial
government shifted its policy on bulk water exports. Due
to mounting public opposition to bulk exports, the
provincial government revoked the licenses and banned
bulk water exports. The opposition centered around
environmental concerns and the way the permits were
granted. Critics contended that the exporters were not
facing the real cost of water because licenses were given
out for minimal administrative fees. 
An American firm, Sun Belt Water Inc., filed a lawsuit
against the provincial government of British Columbia
under NAFTA because of the export ban. In 1991, Sun
Belt and its Canadian-based partner company, Snowcap
Waters, won a contract to supply the city of Goleta,
California, with water from British Columbia. The two
companies planned to use ocean tankers to transport the
water. However, Sun Belt and Snowcap were forced to
default on the contract when the provincial government
placed a moratorium on bulk water exports. Both
companies promptly sued British Columbia’s
government. The province settled with Snowcap, but
refused Sun Belt’s claim of $300 million in damages. As
a result, Sun Belt filed a claim in Canadian federal court
under NAFTA. The international trade agreement entitles
companies operating across international boundaries and
trading recognized commodities to similar legal rights as
their like domestic counterparts. Sun Belt asserts that
British Columbia’s government did not provide equal
treatment to both foreign and national investors when it
settled with Canadian-owned Snowcap but not with U.S.-
owned Sun Belt. This is the first water case tried under
NAFTA and the outcome of the case is eagerly awaited by
proponents and opponents on both sides of the border. 
The case gained renewed interest in 1999 when a
Canadian company, Nova Group Ltd., obtained a permit
from the Ontario government to export water from the
Great Lakes. The permit allowed the company to export
600 million liters of water annually from Lake Superior
to Asia by 2002. However, a political firestorm in both
Canada and the United States forced the Ontario
government to cancel the company’s permit and ban bulk
water exports. Democratic and Republican congressional
members from the Great Lake states responded with
legislation in both the House and Senate to place a
moratorium on Great Lake water exports. The bills were
an overreaction to speculative environmental concerns
that exports would lower lake levels. Similarly, Canada
has proposed amendments to the International Boundary
Waters Treaty with the United States to give the federal
governments on both sides of the border regulatory power
to prohibit bulk water removals from boundary waters,
principally the Great Lakes. 
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As a result of Nova Group’s proposal, the International
Joint Commission (IJC) took up the issue of water
exports. The IJC is a United States-Canada commission
formed under the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty to make
policy recommendations and settle water disputes
between the two countries. In March 2000, the IJC issued
a final policy report recommending that Canadian and
United States federal, provincial, and state governments
not permit the removal of water from the Great Lakes.
The only exception is if the permit applicant can show
that the removal will not have any adverse environmental
effects. In addition, the applicant would have “to
demonstrate that there are no practical alternatives to the
removal, sound planning has been applied in the
proposal, the cumulative impacts of the removal has been
considered, and that conservation practices are in place in
the region importing the water among other
considerations” (International Joint Commission 2000,
45). While the IJC has no binding legal powers of
enforcement in either country, the United States and
Canada will most likely act on the IJC’s recommendation
because its recommendations have never been deliberately
disregarded (Huffman 1994, 14). 
The IJC may be responding more to public sentiment
than to any real environmental threat that water exports
pose to the Great Lakes. The commission conducted an
extensive analysis of the demand for bulk water exports
from the Great Lakes and found that it is limited due to
transportation costs. The report states that “although it
seems clear that climate change and continued reports of
worldwide water shortages will continue to keep
discussion of bulk water shipments alive, the cost of such
shipments makes it unlikely that there will be serious
efforts to take Great Lakes water to foreign markets, and
cost will continue to serve as an impediment to bulk
shipments from coastal waters” (International Joint
Commission 2000). The commission also pointed out that
federally operated diversions from the Great Lakes far
exceed the amounts proposed for bulk water exports. For
example, the federally controlled Chicago Diversion
redirects about 97 cubic meters per second of water from
Lake Michigan into the Mississippi River Basin
(International Joint Commission 2000), an amount 4,550
times greater than Nova Group planned to export. 
The bottled water industry is the major demander of bulk
water. But even here, the IJC found that the Great Lakes
region is a net importer of water. When intrabasin trade
in bottled water is subtracted from the total trade, the
region imports about 141 million liters and exports
roughly 10 million liters. 
The IJC concluded that difficulty and the high-cost of
moving water in bulk will encourage people to seek
cheaper local sources. This is certainly true when the cost
of exporting water is compared to local water prices for
agricultural water, typically the cheapest source. For
example, prices for water transported short distances
range between US$0.75 and US$1.50 per cubic meter.
Those costs go up considerably for longer distances. A
recent review of water prices around the globe showed
that the average price for water from agriculture was
US$0.05 per cubic meter (OECD 1999; World Bank
1998). As a result, no one is moving water great
distances. That may change as water becomes more
scarce and prices rise or shipping costs fall significantly,
but for now, most countries have significant amounts of
cheap water available locally.
The Canadian government has taken a strong position
against water exports. In early 1999, the Canadian
Parliament passed a resolution to develop, in cooperation
with the provinces and territories, a nationwide accord
banning bulk water removals. Much like the United
States, the provinces have jurisdiction over water
allocation so the accord required the approval of the
provinces. However, the provinces are reluctant to
relinquish control over water to federal government. All
four western provinces and Quebec have refused to sign
the federal agreement. Despite their unwillingness to
sign, British Columbia, Alberta, and Quebec already have
bans in place and several other provinces are considering
similar restrictions.
With Canada clogging the flow on water exports,
companies are shifting their focus to Alaska. One such
company is the Vancouver, British Columbia-based
Global Water Corporation. The company holds a contract
with the city of Sitka, Alaska, to export up to 18,500
cubic meters (15 acre-feet) annually for the next thirty
years from nearby Blue Lake (Swagel 1998, 79). Global
Water has been paying the city of Sitka $25,000 a year for
the past five years for the option to export water. That
amount increases to $75,000 during the sixth year of the
option contract. In addition, the city will receive royalties
based on a sliding scale ranging from .002 to 3 cents per
gallon if and when water is exported.
While there are concerns within the community about
selling water, the deal has broad support from most
residents. In 1999, a referendum approving the lease
agreement for the company’s docks passed by a 3 to 1
margin. One reason for the support is that the costs and
benefits for exporting water are internalized. In contrast,
water exports in Canada have been vehemently opposed
because provincial governments were giving away water
to companies with no direct returns to local citizens. The
acrimony surrounding most exports has been averted in
Sitka because the community holds the rights to the water
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in Blue Lake. Because Global Water Company must
compensate the city for any water it takes, it becomes
costly for the local community to say no. The potential
payoff for Sitka could be enormous, reaching as much as
several million dollars a year. For local citizens this
translates into lower property taxes, better roads, and
improved municipal recreational opportunities. 
Global Water Corporation expects to begin exporting
water by the close of 2000. It has contracts with a
Chinese supplier and others throughout Southeast Asia.
Despite a downturn in the Asian economy and slow
negotiations with Chinese trade officials, Global Water is
proceeding with the construction of a $3.5 million dock
designed specifically for loading water onto tankers.
WATER EXPORTS FROM NEW ZEALAND
Several New Zealand entrepreneurs also see potential in
water exports. Okuru Enterprises Limited and Southland
Water Company are two New Zealand companies that
claim they are close to shipping water throughout
Southeast Asia and other parts of the world. Okuru
Enterprises has been working toward this goal for over
nine years. The company spent the first four years
obtaining the New Zealand government's approval to
export water and the last five years seeking buyers. 
For Southland Water Company’s founder, John Fletcher,
the idea of water exports goes back even further. In 1971,
Fletcher’s first export company, Resources Development
Ltd., had a twenty-year right to export New Zealand
water. The company was nearly successful in completing
the country’s first commercial water export, but as it was
loading tankers with water for a customer in Bahrain, a
labor dispute broke out delaying the shipment. The
customer cancelled the order, leaving the company with
financial losses from which it never recovered. Fletcher
revived his ambition in 1993 with Aquamarine Limited,
but was forced to liquidate the company five years later
when it was unable to obtain federal approval to export
water. Southland Water is the entrepreneur’s newest
effort to realize his longtime dream, but the company is
having difficulty convincing local officials to approve its
permit to export water.
WATER EXPORT TECHNOLOGY
Though a number of attempts have been made and even
a few contracts signed, no company is commercially
exporting water by way of large tankers. However, barges
and small tankers are being used to export small amounts
of water short distances. Barges routinely supply water to
islands in the Bahamas, and small tankers occasionally
deliver water to Japan, Taiwan, and Korea (Gleick 1998,
200). These small vessels are also useful in emergency
situations. In fact, during the Gulf War, American troops
were supplied with water shipped in from Turkey.
Water bags technology is another approach that offers a
great deal of promise. With increasing frequency, water
is exported by filling large fabric or plastic sealed bags
that are towed across oceans. These bags range in size
from 750 cubic meters (198,129 gallons) to 17,000 cubic
meters (4.5 million gallons), but the larger bags are not
in commercial use, and until recently, were not able to
sustain the rigor of ocean transport (Gleick 1998, 200).
A handful of companies are using the bag technology to
deliver water for $1 to $2 per cubic meter, which is
typically cheaper than the cost of desalinated water.
Aquarius Water Transportation of the United Kingdom
and Greece was the first company to commercially deliver
water with bags (Gleick 1998, 200). In 1997, it began
hauling 290,000 cubic meters (76.6 million gallons) of
water from Greece to the tiny island of Aegina, a distance
of 13 miles. The water supplements the island’s main
supply which comes by tanker. Aquarius may be called
upon for more deliveries on Aegina and throughout the
Greek Isles because the company’s bagged water is
cheaper than tankered water. 
In 1997, Nordic Water Supply Company based in Oslo,
Norway, completed the first international export of water
with bags when it signed a supply contract with Turkey
to deliver water to northern Cyprus. The contract called
for more than seven million cubic meters to be delivered
within two years at an annual cost of $4.1 million (Gleick
1998, 203). The deal drew immediate protest from the
Cyprus government, which does not recognize Turkey’s
claim on the northern part of the island. However, Nordic
carried out the contract contending that there are no
United Nations mandatory sanctions against the Turkish
regime in northern Cyprus. 
Clearly, exporting water by bags and tankers will not
alleviate growing global thirst. This approach is
expensive and the amount of water that can be
transported is small relative to demand. Yet, bag and
tanker exports are a way to provide immediate relief to
drought stricken areas and to places looking for water to
supplement existing sources. The recent developments of
bag and tanker exports also demonstrate the type of
entrepreneurial solutions that develop when market forces
come into play.
INTERSTATE WATER MARKETS
Interstate (within nation) water markets offer a blueprint
for how global water markets might work. With the
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increasing demands and growing value of water,
proposals to develop water markets that cross political
boundaries have increased. A few interstate markets are
emerging in Australia and the United States.
Australia has the longest and most extensive experience
with interstate trading. In the 1970s, states within
Australia’s Murray-Darling Basin first introduced water
rights. The basin covers over a million square kilometers
and drains parts of four states – New South Wales,
Victoria, South Australia, and Queensland. South
Australia was the first state to introduce water trading
(Bjornlund and McKay 1998). By the early 1980s,
intrastate trading was occurring throughout the basin
states. Growing water scarcity problems, however, created
pressure to expand the market and allow interstate trades.
The first interstate transfer took place in 1992, a five-year
lease of nearly 9.9 million cubic meters (8,000 acre-feet)
from a river in New South Wales to a cotton farm in
South Australia (Sturgess 1996, 135).
Interstate trading in Australia has grown considerably
since this first deal. In 1998, a pilot project was
introduced to allow permanent interstate water right
trades within the basin. The project is overseen by the
Murray-Darling Basin Commission, which coordinates
administrative and legal procedures among the
participating states of South Australia, New South Wales,
and Victoria. This arrangement avoids the complications
that can arise from trading water rights with different
legal entitlements and restrictions. The commission has
established water rights for the basin rather than for
arbitrarily defined geopolitical boundaries. As a result,
water rights are more easily traded across state
boundaries. Not surprisingly, land with water rights
increased significantly (Anderson 1998, 429).
Since the program’s inception, more than 3,431
megalitres (906 million gallons) of water have been
traded across state borders (Murray-Darling Basin
Commission 1999, 27). The Murray-Darling Basin
Commission (1999, 28) reports that most permanent
interstate trades transfer water from low-value uses to
higher-value irrigation developments such as horticulture
and viticulture enterprises. The pilot project has been so
successful in such a short period that the commission is
considering ways to expand interstate trading into the rest
of the region. Currently, trading is limited to the Mallee
region of the basin, which spans the three states involved
in the project. 
The evolution of interstate trading in the Murray-Darling
Basin is the type of water marketing federation that
Huffman (1994) recommends to deal with water issues
between the United States and Canada and the United
States and Mexico. The federation would provide a single
political authority over the definition, transfer, and
enforcement of water rights and the regulation of water
use in a particular basin. Such an organization could take
many forms, but at a minimum it would unify water
rights, making them transferable and enforceable on both
sides of the border. The federation would have the
authority to enforce legitimate rights claims and would
decide whether proposed rights transfers or water sales
infringe on existing vested rights. 
A similar interstate trading arrangement is taking shape
in the United State’s  lower Colorado River Basin where
a recent agreement allows Arizona to bank water for
California and Nevada. Initiated by the U.S. Department
of Interior to serve interstate water needs, the new
interstate water banking program is an expansion of
Arizona’s water banking program. The bank was first
started in 1996 to allow Arizona more use of its shares of
the Colorado River. At that time, the state legislature
limited the bank to intrastate trades. 
Under the new agreement, California and Nevada will be
allowed to store river water in Arizona’s underground
aquifers, banking it for the future. When either state
needs water, it takes its share of the river plus some of
Arizona’s unused allotment. In return, Arizona pumps
water from the aquifer, with California and Nevada
paying the pumping and storage cost plus a fixed rate for
the water. 
Nevada is expected to be the new bank’s biggest customer
because the state has experienced record growth in Las
Vegas and holds a small share in the Colorado River.
California, on the other hand, is showing little interest in
the bank. For years, the state has benefited from unused
river allocations by upstream states. As of now, any
unused water allocated to Arizona and Nevada runs
downstream to California, which consumes it at a rate of
nearly 1,233 million cubic meters per year. With the bank
in place, Arizona and Nevada can either store the water
or charge California for its use. The upper basin states of
Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, and Wyoming, which are
not currently utilizing their full river allotment provided
under the Colorado River Compact, would like to see the
interstate banking program include them.
CONCLUSION
It is sometimes said that water runs uphill to money but
gushes uphill to politics. In the past this has been true
throughout the world where huge water projects funded
by government have “made the desert bloom like a rose.”
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Supply-side solutions with governments building
subsidized dams and delivery systems to supply cheap
water are becoming harder and harder to implement due
to fiscal and environmental constraints. Water crises are
becoming more common around the world, building
pressure to change the institutions that govern water
allocation.
Water markets and water exports are improving the way
water is managed and used. They have created huge
incentives to conserve water where none previously
existed and they are providing an equitable and efficient
way to reallocate water to meet our constantly changing
and growing needs. The enormous financial potential of
these markets encourages much needed new investment
from the private sector. But despite these rapid changes,
water markets face a number of challenges. The success
and future of these nascent markets ultimately hinges on
legislative activities and government’s ability to establish
water rights that encourage active trading. This requires
defining what water can be exported, how benefits and
costs are allocated, and establishing clearly defined,
secure, and tradable water rights. Such water rights
ensure that owners bear the benefits and costs of their
decision to keep or trade water. 
Water exports could play a greater role in supplying
water to regions with limited alternative sources,
alleviating the stresses of drought, and providing a
reliable source of high quality drinking water. But this
requires realistic prices that give consumers an incentive
to conserve and entrepreneurs an incentive to increase
supplies. At today’s relatively low prices, profits may not
be sufficient to stimulate massive expansions in this small
but growing portion of water markets. For example, at
$1.00 per cubic meter of water, the delivery of 1,000
cubic meters (264,172 gallons) only grosses $1,000
compared to over $125,000 for oil assuming a price of
$20 per barrel. More water crises will change these
numbers, however, and will make it difficult to keep a
good market down.
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